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Merger and takeover transactions have a profound impact of on the 
interests of shareholders and society in general.  For this reason, it is 
essential that the legal system provide a reliable mechanism for 
determining the validity of practices that have the potential either to 
facilitate or inhibit such transactions.  This article seeks to demonstrate 
that the rules currently governing the exercise of directors’ powers are 
ineffective to protect the interests of shareholders and society in general in 
circumstances involving the use of exclusivity and break-up fee agreements, 
practices that are fairly new, but which are becoming increasingly common 
in Australia.  The equitable doctrines of fiduciary law against which the 
validity of these arrangements is determined do not provide clear guidance 
as to when it is acceptable for directors of target companies to enter into 
such agreements.  There is thus need for reform, so as to promote clarity 
and predictability of the law in this area.  This will enable all interested 
parties to proceed on reasonable expectations in organizing their affairs 
whenever these arrangements are involved.  In undertaking this reform, 
policy makers would serve investors and society generally better if they 
adopted shareholder welfare enhancement as the criterion for adopting the 
applicable rules in this area.  Exclusivity and break-up fee agreements 
should be permitted where they are designed to maximise shareholder 
wealth but not otherwise.  The article explores ways in which the law could 
be reformed to achieve this objective. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, Australia has witnessed a noticeable surge in merger and 
takeover activity.  As several commentators have observed, these transactions do have a 
significant impact on the interests of shareholders and the economic order of society in 
general.  They have the potential to promote efficiency, either by facilitating desirable 
changes in corporate control1 or by enabling companies to combine their productive 
capacities - physical assets or management teams or both.2  This might enable the merged 
firm to reap synergistic gains through the elimination of unnecessary production, marketing 
and distribution costs or the duplication of expenditures on research and development.  Apart 
from assisting the affected firm to become more efficient, a merger (or acquisition) might 
promote industry rationalisation, to the benefit of the economy as a whole.3  At the same 
time, these transactions can also enhance shareholder wealth.4  In view of the substantial 
 
1 Bureau of Industry Economics,  Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Issues of Economic Efficiency, Working Paper No 53, Canberra, 1989, at 15;  Department 
of Trade and Industry, Mergers Policy: A Department of Trade and Industry Paper On The Policy and 
Procedures Of Merger Control, HMSO, London, 1988, para 2.27;  A Shleifer, & R W Vishny, `Value 
Maximisation And The Acquisition Process' (1988) 2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 at 11–3;      
P Holl, `Control Type and the Market For Corporate Control in Large U S Corporations' in R Posner & 
K E Scott, Economics of Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston and Toronto, 1980 at 206. 
2 J C Coffee Jr, `Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender 
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1145 at 1221;  Bureau of 
Industry Economics,  Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Issues of Economic Efficiency, Working Paper No 53, Canberra, 1989, at 14; Treasury Department, 
Some Economic Implications of Takeovers, Treasury Economic Paper 12, AGPS, Canberra, 1986 at 7. 
3 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliament, House of Representative Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies: Profiting from Competition, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1989, para 3.2.15. 
4 F H McDougall, & D K Round, The Effects of Takeovers and Mergers in Australia, Research Report 
No 3, Information Australia for the Australian Institute of Management, Melbourne, 1986 at 83-6;       
A Mandelbaum, `Economic Aspects of Takeovers Regulation With Particular Reference To New 
Zealand' in J H Farrar, (ed) Takeovers, Institutional Investors and the Modernization of Corporate 
Laws, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993 at 208;  J Franks, & R Harris, `Shareholder Wealth 
Effects of UK Take-overs: Implications For Merger Policy' in J Fairburn, & J Kay, Mergers and 
Merger Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987 at 157-59;  W Lonergan, The Valuation of Businesses, 
Shares and Other Equity, Longman Professional, Melbourne, 2nd edition, 1994 at 338;  R Kraakman, 
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benefits that they can confer on both private parties and society in general, it is desirable that 
the law provides a reliable mechanism for determining the legal propriety of practices that 
have the potential either to facilitate or to inhibit these transactions.  Only then can the public 
interest and the interests of all parties to merger and transfer of control transactions be 
adequately protected. 
This paper considers the use of certain devices designed to improve the chances of success of 
negotiated mergers and acquisitions of corporate control:  no-shop, no-talk (or exclusivity)5 
agreements and break-up fees.  These strategies are fairly new,6 but are becoming 
increasingly common in corporate control transactions in Australia.7  Its major premise is that 
the general legal and equitable doctrines of fiduciary law governing the exercise of directors’ 
powers, which the courts presently apply in determining the validity of these agreements,8 are 
ineffective to adequately protect the interests of all parties whose interests may be affected by 
the use of such strategies.  The standard of review provided by these doctrines does not 
provide a clear and definite guide as to when a decision to enter into an exclusivity agreement 
or an agreement to pay a break-up fee constitutes a proper exercise of directors’ powers.  
 
`Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices As An Acquisition 
Motive' (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 890. 
5 These terms are hereafter used inter-changeably. 
6 See for example Santow J’s observation in Application of Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 529, 
a recent decision the Supreme Court of New South Wales.  There, His Honour acknowledged (at 529) 
that `the concept of an exclusivity period during which alternative merger arrangements and their 
solicitation are constrained’ is ‘still novel’.
7 For a detailed account of transactions in which break-up fees have featured see J Mannolini & A Rich, 
‘Break Fee Agreements in Takeovers’ 2001 (19) C&SLJ 222 at 245-49. 
8 Other aspects of company law may be relevant in determining the validity of these arrangements.  For 
example, in the context of a takeover, one may need to consider whether entry into either type of 
agreement is acceptable in terms of s657A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  In the case of break-up 
fees, questions may arise whether these are permissible in view of the provisions relating to 
transactions affecting share capital, especially Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 2J.1 (Share Capital 
Reductions) and Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 2J.3 (Financial Assistance).  These matters are not 
considered here.  Interested readers may refer to the following works where these issues are canvassed 
in detail: Mannolini & Rich, above n 7, at 229-233;  W Charnley & B Breslin,  `Break-fees: Financial 
Assistance and Directors’ Duties’  (2000) 21 Company Lawyer 269. 
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That standard leaves the courts free to consult the interests either of shareholders or of the 
company as a commercial entity in deciding whether to uphold or disallow such a measure.  
This renders it difficult for interested parties to predict with certainty whether or not a legal 
challenge to such measures will, if mounted, be successful.  This uncertainty is undesirable.  
It has the potential to discourage some aggrieved parties from testing, in court, the propriety 
of a suspect exclusivity or break-up fee agreement.  It also has the potential to serve merely 
as an instrument of legal maneuvering.  In the process, the efficacy of the law in promoting 
shareholder and social welfare might be reduced.  There is thus need to reform the law so as 
to promote clarity and certainty in this area.  This will enable all parties to negotiated merger 
or acquisition transactions to proceed on reasonable expectations in organizing their affairs 
whenever the use of these arrangements is contemplated, and very importantly, likely 
encourage aggrieved parties to more readily challenge questionable no-shop or break-up fee 
agreements. 
To achieve the necessary degree of certainty and predictability, this article recommends the 
introduction of distinct and specific standards to regulate exclusivity and break-up fee 
agreements.  The new regulatory regime should clearly spell out when it is acceptable for 
target directors to enter into a no shop / no talk agreement or commit a target to pay a break-
up fee.  For reasons articulated later on in this article,9 it is suggested that in undertaking this 
task, policy makers should adopt shareholder welfare enhancement as the criterion for 
developing the applicable rules in this area.  Thus, an exclusivity clause or a break-up fee 
agreement should be upheld if it is calculated to promote shareholder welfare, but not 
otherwise.  In the particular case of break-up fee agreements, the governing regime should 
prescribe clear guidelines on the calibration of the size of the fee payable. 
 
9 See Part 4.1 below. 
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The ensuing analysis is organized as follows.  Part 2 identifies some of the problems 
encountered by prospective merger partners or acquirers of corporate control.  It then goes on 
to describe some strategies – exclusivity clauses and break-up fee agreements - devised by 
acquirers and their advisers to overcome these problems.  Next, Part 3 considers the legal and 
practical effects of these strategies.  While accepting that these arrangements can serve some 
legitimate and beneficial legal and economic functions, it argues that they are susceptible to 
abuse.  In particular, they can be used to stymie competitive bidding for a company and/or to 
coerce shareholders to approve an inferior offer. In view of the potential for abuse, the 
discussion goes on to examine the efficacy of the rules presently applied by the courts in 
determining the validity of a decision by the directors to enter into such arrangements.  The 
analysis in this part concludes that the current regime is inadequate to deal with the unique 
problems posed by these arrangements.  To minimize the potential for abuse, it is 
recommended that the law be reformed to exercise more control over the use of exclusivity 
and break-up fee arrangements.  Part 4 sets forth some proposals for reform.  Some 
conclusions follow in Part 5. 
2 DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
Corporate mergers require shareholder10 and, sometimes, regulatory11 approval before they 
can be fully consummated.  This creates some particular problems for parties to merger 
agreements or prospective acquirers.  During the period it takes to obtain the approvals 
required to complete the transaction, which can be several months, circumstances might 
change.  A rival, and perhaps, superior bid might be made for the target.  The directors of the 
 
10 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 5.1. 
11 For example, authorisation by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission may be required 
if the merger would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in a market.  See the Trade Practices Act, 1975 (Cth) ss 50 and 88(9). 
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target might simply change their mind and decide not to proceed with the transaction.  Or 
they might decide to seek out a different merger partner.12
The occurrence of any of these events can seriously jeopardise the interests of the initial 
offeror.  That bidder may have incurred substantial costs in searching for and identifying a 
merger partner and making the initial offer.  These include the costs of investigating and 
estimating the value of the target company, lining up financing, complying with 
governmental regulations and preparing the necessary documentation.13  That expenditure is 
certainly bound to be wasted if the transaction is not completed.  Another problem faced by 
the bidder is that during the course of the negotiations with the target board, and while 
awaiting shareholder approval of the transaction, it might miss out on valuable alternative 
merger or acquisition opportunities. 
In order to protect themselves against such risks, the practice has emerged whereby 
prospective acquirers require the board of the potential merger partner to agree to an 
exclusivity (no-shop / no-talk) agreement.  Alternatively, the target might be required to 
reimburse the initial bidder’s expenses (break-up fee) if the deal is not consummated.14  Quite 
often, both devices are used in tandem with each other. 
A typical exclusivity provision enjoins the grantor not to `initiate contact with, solicit, 
encourage or participate in any way in discussions or negotiations with, or provide 
 
12 K J Burgess, `Gaining Perspective: Directors’ Duties in the Context of “No-shop” and “No-Talk” 
Provisions in Merger agreements’ [2001] Columbia Business Law Review 431 at 431-2. 
13 M Kahan & M Klausner, `Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law 
Review 1539 at 1547;  G V Varallo & S M Raju, `A Process Based Model for Analyzing Deal 
Protection measures’ (2000) Business Lawyer 1609 at 1670. 
14 Burgess, above n 12, at 431-2;  Varallo & Raju, above n 13, at 1670;  L E Strine Jr, `Categorical 
Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements’ (2001) 56 Business 
Lawyer 919 at 921-2. 
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information or assistance to, any third party concerning any acquisition of the company.’15  
Under this type of clause, the directors of the target are forbidden from taking any action, 
such as seeking or considering an alternative, even higher bid, which would render the 
consummation of the lock-up merger less likely.  The intention is clear: to require the target 
to support a merger between it and the grantee of the option.  It has been suggested that 
exclusivity provisions of this nature are often the most effective method of ensuring 
success.16
In some instances, an exclusivity agreement contains an express ‘fiduciary out’ clause.  
Pursuant to that provision, the target’s directors agree, either implicitly or explicitly, to 
support the merger but retain the right to solicit other bids or negotiate with other bidders if 
their fiduciary duties require them to do so.17  A variant of the ‘fiduciary out’ clause is the 
 
15 See D J Block et al, The Business Judgment Rule Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors, 5th ed 1998, 
Vol 1, Aspen Law & Business, New York at 939;  S M Bainbridge `Exclusive Merger Agreements and 
Lock-ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions’ (1990) 75 Minnesota Law Review 239 at 243-55.    
See also Takeovers Panel, Lock-up Devices Guidance Note, 2002, available at 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/Content/Policy/lockupdevices.asp (date of access: 2 February 2002), 
para 26. 
16 Bainbridge, above n 15, at 246. 
17 The recent case of Application of Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 529 provides a good 
illustration of this.  The relevant clause in that case provided thus: 
Exclusivity 
NCE and Yates 
(a) agree that they will co-operate with each other to achieve a merger and 
during the Exclusivity Period will not have any discussions or dealings  with 
any other person that might relate to or have the result in the merger between 
NCE and Yates not proceeding; 
(b) agree that clause 8(a) will only impose obligations on Yates to the extent 
that to cause Yates to fulfil such obligations would not involve a breach of 
the duties of the directors of Yates or be unlawful on any other basis; and 
(c) acknowledge that clause 8(b) will not be used or claimed by Yates to justify 
the solicitation of possible purchasers of Yates or its business or the 
initiation of discussions or dealings with any other person in relation to the 
possible purchase of Yates or its business unless failure to do so would 
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‘best efforts clause’.  This requires the target to employ its best efforts to consummate the 
agreed merger.18  According to Vinelott J, an undertaking of this nature is necessarily subject 
to anything that the directors of the target are required to do pursuant to their fiduciary 
obligations.19  The target’s board must employ its best efforts to consummate the agreed 
merger but its right to engage in discussions with, and provide information to competing 
bidders is successfully preserved.  If a rival bidder tops the no-shop bid, the directors must 
consider it.20
As previously pointed out, agreements not to solicit alternative offers or negotiate with rival 
bidders are frequently, though not always, accompanied by an undertaking by the target to 
pay a lump sum cash payment to the bidder should a contemplated merger not materialize.21  
This feature is primarily a method for reimbursing the disappointed merger partner for the 
expenditure incurred in pursuing a transaction.22  It is intended to entice a party that would 
otherwise have been unwilling to do so to bid for a company by providing some form of 
compensation for the risks it is undertaking.23  This is out of recognition that in some 
instances `a “white knight” . . . might only enter the bidding for the target company if it 
receives some form of compensation to cover the risks and costs involved.’24  As the courts 
and several commentators have rightly pointed out, `some persons are reluctant to commit the 
 
involve a breach of the duties of the directors of Yates confirmed by Senior 
Counsel's advice, it being recorded that no such circumstances are presently 
envisaged. 
18 For a typical best efforts clause see Bainbridge, above n 15, at 243 (fn 10). 
19 See John Crowther Group Ltd v Carpets International plc [1990] BCLC 460 at 464. 
20 For a comprehensive analysis of various no-shop provisions and their legal effect, reference may be 
made to Block et al, above n 15, at 939-57. 
21 See further Santow J’s observations in Application of Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 529 at 
530;  Charnley & Breslin, above n 8, at 269;  Burgess, above n 12 at 431-2;  Varallo & Raju, above n 
13 at 1670;  Note, ‘Inducement Fees Circumscribed’ [2000] JBL 59. 
22 Block et al, above n 15, at 966;  Takeovers Panel, above n 15, para 17. 
23 Mannolini & Rich, above n 7, at 232;  Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1540. 
24 Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings 506 A 2D 173 (1986) at 183.  See also Application of 
Arthur Yates & Co Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 529 at 530 at 531;  Charnley & Breslin, above n 8, at 270. 
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necessary time, effort and expense to make a bid if they believe that it will be used as a 
“stalking horse” to obtain higher bids.’25  The following  observation neatly summarises the 
case for break-up fees:26  
the uncertainty that a merger agreement will be consummated 
due to the possibility of a competing bid or the failure of 
shareholders for some other reason to approve the transaction 
has led many acquirors to insist upon termination or “break-up” 
fees, pursuant to which the corporation is obligated to pay a 
specified sum (often amounting to as much as 1 to 3 per cent – 
or even more – of the aggregate value of a transaction) to the 
corporation’s merger partner if the transaction is not 
consummated . . . The promise to pay a termination fee 
typically is in addition to an expense reimbursement provision 
requiring reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses incurred 
by a merger partner if the merger agreement is terminated due 
to a competing bid or is not approved by shareholders for some 
other reason. 
By stimulating an initial bid or persuading other prospective acquirers to enter a bidding 
contest, a break-up fee agreement can benefit shareholders.27
 
25 Revlon Inc v Macandrews & Forbes Holdings 506 A 2D 173 (1986) at 183.  See further Arthur Yates 
& Co Ltd [2001] NSWSC 40;  Hanson Trust plc v ML SCM Acquisitions Inc 781 F 2d 264 (1986); at 
281;  Jewel Companies Inc v Pay Less Drug Store North West 741 F 2d 1555 (1984) at 1563; P Davies, 
Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th ed 1997, Sweet & Maxwell, London at 786; 
Bainbridge, above n 15, at 317;  Varallo & Raju, above n 13 at 1680;  K J Nachbar, `Revlon Inc v 
Macandrews & Forbes Holdings Inc – The Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested 
Mergers, and its Effect on Lock-ups and Other Bidding Deterrents’ [1987] 12 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 473. 
26 Block et al, above n 15, at 957;  Bainbridge, above n 15, at 246.  Indeed, in Dawson International plc v 
Coats Paton plc [1989] BCLC 233, the plaintiffs based part of their claim on the ground that they 
would not have made an offer at all if the situation was likely to become one of a contested bid – see 
page 246. 
27 There is a vibrant debate on the benefits and costs of auctions.  A detailed discussion of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  For representative literature on this subject reference may be made to 
R Gilson, `A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender 
Offers' (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 819 at 868-875;  R Gilson,  'Seeking Competitive Bids Versus 
Pure Passivity In Tender offer Defense' (1982) 35 Stanford Law Review 51;  G R Andre, `Tender 
Offers For Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis And Proposals For Reform' (1987) 12 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 865 at 905-906;  L A Bebchuk,  'The Case For Facilitating Competing 
Tender Offers' (1981-82) 95 Harvard Law Review 1028 at 1039-41;  L A Bebchuk, 'The Case For 
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension' (1982) 35 Stanford Law Review 23;     
M Gillen, 'Economic Efficiency And Takeover Bid Regulation' (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
919 at 931-939;  J C Coffee Jr, `Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment 
of The Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1145 at 1280 et 
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3 THE CONCERN WITH NO-SHOP AND BREAK-UP FEE AGREEMENTS 
Exclusivity and break-up fee agreements reduce the risk that the merger between the target 
and the grantee will not proceed.  Whilst they may be beneficial in this important respect, 
these arrangements do present problems of their own.  For example, a no-shop agreement 
commits the target’s directors to support a particular bidder.  As a consequence, the target is 
prevented from co-operating, or dealing, with rival bidders.  This has the potential to 
discourage some prospective acquirers from coming forward,28 to the possible detriment of 
shareholders, who are thereby denied the benefit of an auction for their shares.  Another 
major potential problem is that the directors may agree to a no-shop clause in furtherance of 
their own parochial interests, in conflict with their duty to act in best interests of the 
company.29  They might, for instance, do so to facilitate the company to be acquired by a 
bidder that promises not oust them from their positions after the merger, or to confer on them 
extra side benefits, rather than one offering the best terms.30  Again, this may deny 
shareholders a higher return on their investment or frustrate a more strategic merger.  More 
seriously, the ability to influence the outcome of a bidding contest, by ensuring that the 
company is acquired by a party that will not to penalise them, has the potential to diminish 
the disciplinary effect of corporate control transactions on corporate management.  It may 
also subvert the public interest by preventing corporate assets from passing to their highest 
 
seq;  R A Ragazzo,  'The Legitimacy of Takeover Defense in The '90s' (1992) 42 DePaul Law Review 
689 at 707-10;  F H Easterbrook, & D R Fischel,  `Corporate Control Transactions' (1982) 91 Yale Law 
Journal 698;  F H Easterbrook, & D R Fischel,  `Auctions and Sunk Costs' (1982) 35 Stanford Law 
Review 1. 
28 Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1552-53;  Burgess, above n 12 at 439;  M Lebovitch &                     
P B Morrison, `Calling a Duck  a Duck: Determining the Validity of Deal protection Provisions in 
Merger of Equals Transactions’ 2001] Columbia Business Law Review 1 at 45. 
29 This matter is treated in more detail in the next Part of this article. 
30 Bainbridge, above n 15, at 272-75;  Lebovitch & Morrison,  above n 28 at 13-4 
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valued uses.  This may have serious implications for the efficient functioning of the economy 
generally.31
Break-up fees also give rise to similar concerns.  In particular, a termination fee, especially if 
it is large enough, can make a transaction more expensive.  This might reduce the target 
firm’s value and, in the process, discourage competing bidders.32 As Kahan and Klausner 
have elucidated:33
the outcome of a bidding contest depends on the maximum 
prices bidders are willing to pay for a target – their “reservation 
prices.”  A bidder’s reservation price depends on the profit it 
expects to gain if it acquires the target at a certain price, and on 
its opportunity costs of acquiring the target (in a sense its 
“profits” if it fails to acquire the target).  Bidders will bid up to 
the price at which these amounts are equal.  For example if 
Alpha Corp values Targetcorp at $800 million, and has no 
opportunity cost of acquiring Targetcorp, it will bid up to, but 
not beyond $800 million (the point at which its profits from the 
acquisition would equal zero). 
If a target grants a lockup to one bidder, the lockup will 
effectively constitute a liability to another bidder (a “locked-
out” bidder) that succeeds in acquiring the target.  The lockup 
reduces the profit the locked-out” bidder obtains from acquiring 
the target at any given price by a sum equal to the value of the 
lockup. 
In addition to their potential effect on the incentives of prospective bidders, break-up fee 
arrangements are hazardous in another important respect.  As the payment of such a fee is 
triggered if shareholders reject a merger proposal, there is potential for directors to use a 
break-up fee as a strategy to coerce shareholders into approving a bid favoured by them. They 
 
31 Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1559-60;  P Regan, `Great expectations? A Contract Law Analogy 
for Preclusive Corporate Lockups’ (1999) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1 at 5. 
32 Takeovers Panel, above n 15, paras 18-9. 
33 Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1544 (notes omitted). 
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could do this by agreeing to pay an unconscionably large termination fee to their white knight 
if it loses.34
Because of their potential to stifle unwelcome acquisition bids and allied problems,35 it is 
clear that no-shop and break up fee arrangements can diminish shareholder and social 
welfare.36  Although current law attempts to exercise some control over their use, it is 
presently difficult to predict when a court will rule that the implementation of such measures 
is or is not permissible.  This diminishes the efficacy of the law in protecting the interests of 
shareholders and society in general.  Hence the need to reform the law so as to remove the 
present uncertainty.  Before canvassing possible reforms, however, it is essential first to 
establish the deficiencies of current law.  That forms the task of discussion in the next part. 
3.1 CHALLENGING SUSPECT LOCK-UP AGREEMENTS:  CURRENT LAW 
It is now beyond doubt that where the responsibility for managing the company is, by its 
constitution, vested in the directors,37 they enjoy the general power to make all decisions 
 
34 See generally Block et al, above n 15, at 960;  Lebovitch & Morrison, above n 28, at 45-6;  Varallo & 
Raju, above n 13, at 1680;  Takeovers Panel, above n 15, para 20. 
35 Mannolini & Rich, above n 7, at 232.  Indeed, in one American case, the court found that the directors 
agreed to a break-up fee just as part of an overall plan to thwart a rival bidder.  See Revlon Inc v 
Macandrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2D 173 (1986) at 184. 
36 See further Note, above n 21, at 59-60. 
37 This is ordinarily the case under modern commercial practice.  Most, if not all, companies usually have 
a by-law similar to s198A of the Corporations Act.  That section relevantly provides that: 
The business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of the 
directors. 
The directors may exercise all the powers of the company except any powers 
that this Law or the company’s constitution (if any) requires the company to 
exercise in general meeting. 
On the legal effect of this and similar provisions see Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate 
Company v Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34;  John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113; 
National Roads and Motorists Association v Parker (1986) 4 ACLC 609. 
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(other than those reserved to shareholders in general meeting) on behalf of the company.38 
This includes the power to decide whether the company should enter into an agreement, and 
the terms of any such contract.  In the context of the present discussion, the directors have the 
authority to initiate and negotiate the terms of a merger for approval by shareholders.39
However, it is also common knowledge that in exercising their management powers, the 
directors are subject to some restraints.  These limitations, which are imposed by the 
equitable doctrines of fiduciary law, seek to minimize the potential for directors to act in 
abuse of the immense managerial powers conferred on them.40  Foremost amongst these is 
the directors’ duty of loyalty to the company.41  This requires every exercise of the directors’ 
discretionary powers to be in good faith, for the benefit of the company as a whole.42  The 
same duty further enjoins the directors to exercise their powers for proper purposes,43 not to 
fetter their discretion44 and to avoid any conflict of interest.45
 
38 H A J Ford et al, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, 10th ed 2000, Butterworths, Sydney, para 
7.110 (at 217). 
39 See text accompanying note 10 above. 
40 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 at 185-186;  Ampol Petroleum Limited v R W Miller (Holdings) 
Limited [1972] 2 NSWLR 850 at 856. 
41 Ford et al, above n 38, para 8.010 (at 302-3) 
42 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Limited [1900] 1 Ch 656;  The Australian Metropolitan Life 
Assurance Company Limited v Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199 at 217;  Re Smith & Fawcett Limited [1942] 2 
Ch 304 at 306;  Pergamon Press Limited v Maxwell [1970] 2 All E R 809 at 813. 
43 Re Smith And Fawcett Limited [1942] 1 Ch 306; Allen v Gold Reefs Of West Africa Limited [1900] 1 
Ch 656, 671;  Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Limited [1950] 2 All ER 1120 at 1126;  Pergamon Press 
Limited v Maxwell [1970] 2 All ER 809 at 813; Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 at 185;  The 
Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Company Limited v Ure (1923 ) 33 CLR 199 at 217;  Hindle v 
John Cotton Limited (1919) 56 Sc L R 625 at 630. 
These general equitable obligations have now been adopted by the Parliament and codified into 
statutory obligations.  See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 181(1) which provides that: 
a director . . . of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties 
(a) in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; and 
(b) for a proper purpose. 
For an erudite discussion of the legal effect of the codification of the directors’ fiduciary obligation to 
act in the interest of the company see Ford et al, above n 38, para 8.065 at 315;  B S Butcher,  
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The effect of the duty of loyalty is to render invalid any action of the directors that is not 
motivated by considerations of good faith concern for the interests of the company.  To this 
extent, the equitable doctrines of fiduciary law go some way in protecting the interests of the 
company.46  These principles are, however, not always helpful to shareholders wishing to test 
the legal propriety of either a no-shop, no-talk or break-up fee agreement which they consider 
to be detrimental to their interests, for example one that is likely to chill an auction for the 
company. 
 
Directors’ Duties: A New Millennium, A New Approach? 2000, Kluwer Law International, London, at 
141. 
44 Thorby v Goldberg (1965) 112 CLR 597.  This matter is explored in more detail in Part 3.1.2 below. 
45 See for example Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1978) 18 ALR 1;  Consul Developments Pty Ltd v  
D P C Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 49 ALJR 74;  Furs Limited v Tomkies Limited (1936) 54 CLR 583;  
Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46;  Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44;  Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros 
(1854) 1 Macq 461; [1843-60] All ER Rep 249. 
There is a substantial volume of literature on the directors’ duty of loyalty.  As a starting point, the 
following works may prove quite helpful:  Ford et al, above n 38, at 315-60;  Davies, above n 25, at 
599-623;  Butcher, above n 43, at 95-127;  J H Farrar & B M Hannigan,  Farrar's Company Law, 
Butterworths, London, 4th ed 1998 at 377-391;  R C Nolan, `The Proper Purpose Doctrine and 
Company Directors’ in B Rider (ed), The Realm of Company Law, 1998, Kluwer Law International, 
London, at 1-35;  S Worthington, ‘Directors’ Duties, Creditors’ Rights and Shareholder Intervention’ 
(1991) 18 MULR 121 at 122-5;  L S Sealy,  ‘"Bona Fides" and "Proper Purposes" in Corporate 
Decisions’ (1989) 15 Mon ULR 265. 
46 The fiduciary duty of loyalty is supplemented by the duty of care.  This has, as its principal aim, to 
protect the company by ensuring that directors do not shirk their responsibilities.  As it is not directly 
relevant to the issues considered here, the duty of care is not discussed in this paper. 
As to the scope and dictates of the duty of care see generally Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells v 
AWA Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 438;  Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited [1925] Ch 407;  
Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations [1911] 1 Ch 425 at 435;  Re Denham (1884) 25 Ch D 752;              
The Overend & Gurney Co v Gibb (1871-72) LR 5 HL 480. 
For an illuminating analysis of the duty of care see by way of example only Ford et al, above n 38, at 
349-360;  P Lipton & A Herzberg, Understanding Company Law, The Law Book Company Limited, 
Sydney, 10th ed 2001, at 338-343;  A S Sievers, `Directors’ Duty of Care: What is the New standard?’  
(1997) C&SLJ 392;  J Cassidy, `An Evaluation of Corporations Law s 232(4) and the Directors’ Duty 
of Care, Skill and Diligence’ (1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 184. 
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3.1.1 The ‘best interests of company’ test 
To determine the legality of an impugned no-shop or break-up fee agreement, a court is 
required to ascertain, amongst other things, whether it was implemented bona fide, in the 
interest of the company as a whole.47  In theory this test is not controversial at all.  However, 
its application presents a major difficulty.  This is so primarily because the edict that 
`directors must act bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole’ is, as Dixon J 
famously observed in Mills v Mills,48 “an indefinite phrase.”49  As interpreted and applied by 
the courts, the concept of `company’ currently admits of different meanings.50  In some 
instances, this duty is said to be an obligation to act bona fide for the benefit of the company 
as a separate legal entity.  In others, it is formulated as a duty to act bona fide for the benefit 
of the shareholders.51  Because ‘company as a whole’ is an ambiguous term,52 it is difficult to 
predict with certainty whether or not a court will sustain a challenge to a lock-up device 
which threatens the interests of shareholders, for example, a no-shop agreement which 
curtails the chances of competing bids being made for a company. 
 
47 See for example Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Limited [1900] 1 Ch 656;  Mills v Mills (1938) 60 
CLR 150;  Ampol Petroleum Limited v R W Miller (Holdings) Limited [1972] 2 NSWLR 850. 
48 (1938) 60 CLR 150. 
49 Ibid at 188. 
50 On the possible different meanings of the term `company’ see Ford et al, above n 38, para 8.090 at 318;  
Farrar & Hannigan, above n 45, at 570-71;  J D Heydon, `Directors' Duties and the Company's 
Interests' in P D Finn (ed), Equity and Commercial Relationships, 1987, The Law Book Company 
Limited, Sydney at 120-26;  G Nicoll, `The Changing Face of the “Company as a Whole” and 
Directors’ Responsibilities to Members in the Exercise of management Powers’ (1994) 4 Aust Jnl of 
Corp Law 187 at 289-303;  F G Rixon, `Competing Interests and Conflicting Principles: An 
Examination of the Power of Alteration of Articles of Association’  (1986) 49 Modern Law Review 446 
at 448. 
51 Heydon, above n 50, at 120. 
52 On this see Re Halt Garage Ltd [1982] 3 All E R 1016 at 1035 where Oliver J poignantly observed that 
this term is not always used in the same sense. 
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3.1.1(a) Acting in the ‘best interests of company’ as a duty to act in the interests of 
shareholders. 
There is a view that the term ‘company as a whole’ means nothing but the general body of 
corporators.53  This idea has been propounded in a number of leading cases.  For example, in 
Ngurli Limited v McCann54 the High Court of Australia, applying the principle set out in the 
English case of Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Limited,55postulated that:56
the phrase `the company as a whole’, does not mean the 
company as a commercial entity, distinct from the corporators: 
it means corporators as a general body. 
According to these cases, the obligation imposed on directors to exercise their powers bona 
fide for the benefit of the company as a whole is a duty to consult the interests of the 
shareholders to the exclusion of those of the separate legal entity, the corporation.57  In other 
words, a reflection of the interests of the company is to be found in the interests of the 
shareholders.58
We are instructed by the authors of the influential Australian treatise Ford’s Principles of 
Corporations Law, that the term shareholders, when used in this context, is usually equated 
with current shareholders.59   The same learned authors also maintain that the obligation to 
act in the best interest of shareholders as used in this context is taken to mean maximising the 
 
53 Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Limited [1951] 1 Ch 286 at 291;  Peter's American Delicacy Company 
Limited v Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457 at 512;  Parke v Daily News [1962] 2 All E R 929 at 948. 
54 (1954) 90 CLR 425. 
55 See [1951] 1 Ch 286 at 291. 
56 (1954) 90 CLR 425at 438. 
57 Ford et al, above n 38, para 8.095 at 319;  Davies, above n 25, at 603;  Nicoll, above n 50, at 291-7. 
58 Heydon, above n 50, at 123. 
59 Ford et al, above n 38, para 8.090 at 318. 
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wealth of shareholders.60  On this view then, it can be argued that the actions of directors 
must be guided by no consideration other than the maximization of the wealth of current 
shareholders.  If this is accepted, then, it is arguable that in merger transactions and other 
transactions involving the transfer of corporate control, it is the duty of the directors of the 
target company to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best price for the shareholders.  To 
do otherwise would be a breach of the duty of loyalty.  On this view, it can be argued that 
shareholders can successfully challenge the validity of lock-up arrangements that preclude 
directors from dealing with rival bidders, especially if the later bid is superior to the no-shop 
bid.  It is also arguable that transactions which makes it more difficult for alternative bids to 
be mounted could be attacked as not being in the interests of shareholders. 
3.1.1(b) Acting in the ‘best interests of company’ as a duty to act in the interests of 
the commercial legal entity. 
Although the previous analysis is quite compelling, there is a distinct possibility that an 
action by shareholders challenging the validity of a no-shop or break-up fee arrangement may 
not be successful. There is a countervailing view to the concept of company just discussed.  
This posits that the powers of directors `are conferred and are exercisable for the benefit of 
the company as a separate corporate entity, and the duty is owed to that entity and not to the 
individual shareholders whether assembled in general meeting or not.’61
From this perspective, the obligation to act in the best interests of the company calls for a 
concentration on the interests of the company as a corporate commercial entity distinct from 
 
60 Id. 
61 B H McPherson, `Duties of Directors and the Powers of Shareholders' (1977) 51 ALJ 460 at 468.  See 
also Nicoll, above n 50, at 297-300;  G F K Santow, `Defensive Measures Against Company Take-
overs' (1979) 53 ALJ 374. 
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the interests of the corporators.62  On this view, directors are free to enter into a no-shop or 
related agreement provided they have acted on an informed basis and honestly believe it to be 
for the benefit of the company as a commercial entity.63  Such an agreement will be upheld 
so long as it was not entered into for `purposes foreign to the company’s operations, affairs 
and organisation.’64  The decisive test is whether the directors exercised their powers in good 
faith and for a proper purpose.65  According to this view, a court will interfere with a no-shop 
agreement only if it is so unreasonable that no `intelligent and honest person in the position of 
a director of the company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, have 
reasonably believed that the [transaction was] for the benefit of the company.’66
In the particular context of corporate control transactions, the view that actions of directors 
are valid if they are for the benefit of the company as a commercial entity finds judicial 
support in several cases.  For example, in Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Company 
Limited (No 2),67 a cash takeover offer of $10 per share was made for all the issued shares in 
the capital of the respondent company.  The last recorded trading price of the subject shares 
prior to this bid was 87 cents.  The offer thus represented `a tenfold increase in the value of 
the shares over their last sale.’68  Nonetheless, the target directors opposed the offer.  To 
 
62 Pine Vale Investments Limited v McDonnell & East Limited (1983) 1 ACLC 1294 at 1305;  Heydon, 
above n 50, at 122. 
63 See Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Company Limited (No 2) (1989) 7 ACLC 659 at 708 and 714 
respectively;  Pine Vale Investments Limited v McDonnell & East Limited (1983) 1 ACLC 1294 at 
1304;  Ashburton Oil No Liability v Alpha Minerals No Liability (1971) 45 ALJR 162 at 163. 
64 Heydon, above n 50, at 122; Winthrop Investments Limited v Winns Limited (1978-80) 4 ACLR 1; 
Ngurli Limited v McCann (1954) 90 CLR 425 at 438;  Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 at 186. 
65 Howard Smith Limited v Ampol Petroleum Limited [1974] A C 821 at 834;  Winthrop Investments 
Limited v Winns Limited (1978-80) 4 ACLR 1;  Harlowe's Nominees Proprietary Limited v Woodside 
(Lakes Entrance) Oil Company N L (1968) 42 ALJR 123 at 125;  P Little, Law of Company Takeovers, 
Law Book Company, Sydney, 1997 at 535. 
66 Charterbridge Corporation Limited v Lloyd's Bank Limited [1970] 1 Ch 62 at 74.  See also Wayde v 
New South Wales Rugby League Limited (1987) 5 ACLC 799 (High Court of Australia). 
67 (1989) 7 ACLC 659. 
68 Ibid, at 665. 
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frustrate it, they caused the target to transfer its crown jewel, a large parcel of land, to a 
wholly owned subsidiary.  The subsidiary then entered into a joint venture agreement with a 
third party to develop the land. 
There can be no doubt that these actions were prejudicial to the interests of the offerees who 
wished to accept the offer and reap the substantial premium offered by the bidder. All the 
same, the majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld the impugned 
transactions.  According to the majority, the directors acted to promote the interests of the 
company as a commercial entity.  Those actions were thus a valid exercise of directors’ 
powers.69
On the basis of this and similar cases,70 it is apparent that, prima facie, a challenge by a 
shareholder to a lock-up involving either a no-shop clause or break-up fee will be not be 
successful if the device can be shown to have served some proper corporate purpose.  In such 
a case, there will be a basis for the directors to argue that they believed the agreement was in 
the interests of the company.  The agreement will stand even if it is shown not to be for the 
benefit of the aggrieved shareholders.71
 
69 Ibid, at 708 and 712. 
70 See, for example, Harlowe's Nominees Proprietary Limited v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Company 
N L (1968) 42 ALJR 123;  The Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Company Limited v Ure (1923) 
33 CLR 199;  Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Limited [1900]1Ch 656;  Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese 
& Co [1920] 1 Ch 154;  Dafen plate Tinplate Co v Llanley Steel Co [1920] 2 Ch 124;  Shuttleworth v 
Cox & Brothers Co (Maidenhead) [1927] 2 K B 9;  Dawson International plc v Coats Paton plc [1989] 
BCLC 233. 
71 See for example Pine Vale Investments Limited v McDonnell & East Limited (1983) 1 ACLC 1294 at 
1304;  Ashburton Oil No Liability v Alpha Minerals No Liability (1971) 45 ALJR 162 at 163 
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3.1.2 Fetters on directors’ discretionary powers 
The principles of fiduciary law governing directors’ duties provide an additional restraint on 
the use of no-shop and break-up fee arrangements.  This is through the obligation imposed on 
directors not to fetter their discretion. 
High authority has established that the `powers given to directors must be exercised for the 
benefit of the company.  Consequently there is no authority for directors to give an 
undertaking . . . that they will not exercise those powers.’72  In view of this, some might 
argue that it is not permissible for directors to agree, on an informed basis, to a no-shop or 
break-up fee agreement, especially if that arrangement would have the effect of restricting 
their ability to exercise their powers in the future.73  It could be argued that if directors 
committed themselves to support a particular bid, thereby precluding their right to consider a 
later (and possibly superior) offer if one is made, such an agreement would constitute a fetter 
of directors’ discretion.  Consequently, the agreement would amount to a breach of directors’ 
fiduciary duty and would be unenforceable.  For, `an undertaking or any other transaction 
made by directors in breach of any of their fiduciary duties is voidable and therefore 
unenforceable against the company.’74
This argument is certainly respectable.  However, it appears that, as presently applied, the 
rule against fettering discretion is also not likely to be very helpful in curbing suspect no-
shop or break-up fee agreements.  Directors’ actions can easily pass muster under this test 
now.  All that directors need to do is to show that after fully appraising all relevant 
 
72 Ashburton Oil No Liability v Alpha Minerals No Liability (1971) 45 ALJR 162 at 163;  Thorby v 
Goldberg (1965) 112 CLR 597 at 605. 
73 See discussion in Part 2.1 above. 
74 Bamford v Bamford [1970] Ch 212;  Wilton Group plc v Abrams [1991] BCLC 315.   For an 
illuminating discussion of this and related issues see A Griffiths, `The Best Interests of Fulham F C:  
Directors’ Fiduciary Duty in Giving Contractual Undertakings’ [1993] Journal of Business Law 576 at 
577. 
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considerations, they genuinely believed that the interest of their company would be best 
served if it merged with, or was acquired by the grantee of the no-shop option or break-up 
fee.  To meet this test, the directors and/or their advisers could undertake a perfunctory search 
and claim that no bidder had indicated any interest.  After that, they could enter into a merger 
agreement with a favoured bidder and undertake not to solicit other bids.  Or, they could 
agree to pay a break-up fee to that bidder.  They could even do both and argue that they acted 
as they did so as to entice the grantee to make an offer for the company.  In these 
circumstances, it is probable that a court would uphold those actions as a permissible 
exercise, and not a fetter, of the directors’ discretion.  This is so notwithstanding that the 
effect of the undertaking would be to limit the scope for exercising their powers in the future. 
A review of the major cases in this area lends considerable support to this view.  For 
example, in Thorby v Goldberg75 the parties entered into an agreement concerning the 
financing of the construction of a building on a property then owned by the appellants, and 
the sharing of office space in that building.  To give effect to that agreement, the appellants 
undertook to take steps to procure the happening of certain events, including the amendment, 
in a specified way, of the articles of association of their company.  The appellants repudiated 
the agreement, upon which the respondents successfully sued for damages for breach of 
contract.  On appeal, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the agreement sued 
upon was void as it bound the directors to act in a fixed manner, in breach of their duties not 
to fetter their discretion.  The High Court of Australia rejected this argument, with Kitto J 
succinctly observing:76
there are many kinds of transactions in which the proper time 
for the exercise of the directors’ discretion is the time of the 
negotiation of a contract, and not the time at which the contract 
is to be performed. . . . If the at the former time they are bona 
 
75 (1965) 112 CLR 597. 
76 Ibid, at 606 (per Kitto J). 
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fide of opinion that it is in the interests of the company that the 
transaction should be entered into and carried into effect, I see 
no reason in law why they should not bind themselves to do 
whatever under the transaction is to be done by the board. 
Another decision worthy of note in this connection is Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra 
Estates Ltd,77 a decision of the English Court of Appeal.  There, the Court was concerned 
with certain undertakings given by the directors of Fulham Football Club Ltd to support the 
respondent in its efforts secure planning permission to re-develop its property which had 
previously served as Fulham’s home ground.  In return, Cabra promised to pay certain sums 
of money to the club (Fulham), which agreed to vacate the property. 
Subsequent to this agreement, however, the directors of Fulham determined that the planned 
re-development would not serve the club’s interest and sought to withhold its support for 
Cabra’s proposals.  To this end, it commenced proceedings seeking a declaration that it was 
not bound by the undertakings given by its directors to Cabra.  This was on the grounds, inter 
alia, that the directors could not fetter the exercise of their discretionary powers through any 
contractual undertaking.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding:78
it is trite law that directors are under a duty to act bona fide in 
the interests of their company.  However, it does not follow 
from that proposition that directors can never make a contract 
by which they bind themselves to the future exercise of their 
powers in a particular manner even though the contract taken as 
a whole is manifestly for the benefit of the company. 
As these cases clearly show, the courts will not always treat an agreement seeking to bind 
directors to exercise their powers in a certain way in the future as necessarily improper.  On 
the contrary, the courts appear to have accepted the view put forward by some commentators 
that `denying directors the power to give undertakings or obliging them to keep their options 
 
77 [1992] BCLC 863. 
78 Ibid at 875 (per Neill L J). 
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would prejudice the interests of companies in general.’79  Indeed, in the Fulham Football 
Club case just discussed, Neill LJ tersely remarked that `such a rule could well prevent 
companies from entering into contracts which were commercially beneficial to them.’80  So, 
on current authority, it appears that an undertaking whereby directors bind themselves not to 
solicit rival bids or to pay a break-up fee will be upheld if it can be shown that at the time of 
giving it, the directors believed that it was in the interest of their company to do so, which 
will not be difficult if the agreement serves some rational business purpose.  This will be 
treated by the courts as an exercise of directors’ discretion, not a fetter of it.81
3.1.3 Interim conclusion 
The legal scheme which currently regulates the exercise of directors’ powers is, at a 
conceptual level, fundamentally flawed and consequently inadequate to handle the special 
problems arising in connection with the use of exclusivity and break-up fee agreements.  The 
governing general legal and equitable principles of fiduciary law permit the directors in some 
circumstances to concentrate on the interests of the separate legal/economic entity, and in 
others on the interests of shareholders.82  This creates considerable uncertainty in determining 
whether or not a decision to enter into these agreements constitutes a proper exercise of 
directors’ powers.  Because of this uncertainty, shareholders are likely to be loath to 
challenge suspect no-shop / no-talk or break-up fee agreements.  In the result, directors are 
left relatively free to use these devices to manipulate corporate control either by impeding 
competing bids or by facilitating control of a company to pass to parties favourable to them. 
This is undesirable.  It has the potential to diminish both shareholder and social welfare.  
 
79 Griffiths, above n 74, at 578. 
80 [1992] BCLC 863 at 875. 
81 See Thorby v Goldberg (1965) 112 CLR 597 at 617-8 (per McTiernan J and Windeyer J). 
82 Richard Brady Franks Limited v Price (1937) 58 CLR 112 at 143 (per Dixon J). 
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Also, it provides fertile ground for tactical maneuvering, legal posturing and skirmishing 
which can be exploited by malcontents, to the potential detriment of shareholders and society 
in general.  Hence the need for reform of the law in this area.  Some proposals for reform are 
set out in the next part. 
4 PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
4.1 Validity 
There is need to promote certainty as to when a decision by directors to enter into no-shop, 
no-talk and break-up fee agreements is acceptable.  To achieve this, a new standard for 
reviewing the validity of these agreements should be introduced in lieu of the present ‘benefit 
of the company’ test.  As presently applied, this term is, as Dr Rixon once bluntly put it, ‘a 
Delphic term employed by different judges in different circumstances to signify different 
things.’83
In undertaking the proposed reform, policy makers would serve the investing community and 
society generally well if they adopted shareholder welfare enhancement as the criterion for 
developing the applicable standards in this area.  An approach focussing on shareholder 
welfare has a lot to commend it.  In the first place, it recognises that shareholders are the 
 
83 Rixon, above n 50, at 454.  To compound this difficulty, it is sometimes argued that directors owe an 
independent duty to outside constituencies, for example creditors, employees, customers etc.  To 
protect these interests, it is suggested that the directors’ duty to act in the interests of the company 
should be relaxed so as to give directors more discretion to look after these constituencies.  See for 
example Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1;  Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 
395; Jeffree v National Companies and Securities Commission  (1989) 7 ACLC 556;  Sydlow Pty Ltd v 
Melwren Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 144.  This issue will not be canvassed here.  For a more detailed 
discussion of this matter, interested readers may refer to Nicoll, above n 50, at 291—3;  Heydon, above 
n 50, at 120 et seq;  R Baxt, `Do Directors Owe Duties to Creditors – Some Doubts Raised by the 
Victoria Court of Appeal’ (1997) 15 C&SLJ 373 at 374-5;  J J Mannolini, `Creditor’s [sic] Interests in 
the Corporate Contract: A Case for the reform of Our Insolvent Trading Provisions’ (1996) 6 Aust Jnl 
of Corp Law 14 especially at 22-3;  L S Sealy, `Directors' "Wider" Responsibilities - Problems 
Conceptual, Practical and Procedural' (1987) 13 Mon U L R 164. 
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“owners of the company”,84 they being the people who have risked their capital in the hope 
of gain.85  In any case, as Hansmann and Kraakman have argued, there now appears to be a 
`consesus among the academic, business, and governmental elites in leading jurisdictions . . . 
that . . . the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the 
corporation in the interests of its shareholders’86 and that `other constituencies such as 
creditors, employees, suppliers and customers should have their interests protected by 
contractual and regulatory means rather than participation in corporate governance.’87
In view of this, it would make eminent sense to require directors to act primarily in the 
interests of shareholders in these circumstances.  This will likely have the added advantage of 
promoting greater accountability of directors, which is bound to be impaired if directors are 
at liberty to consider other diffuse interests.  For, as Professor Sealy once observed, if in the 
discharge of their duties directors may relevantly consider:88
potentially opposed interests, the duty imposed on them 
bifurcates and fragments so that it amounts ultimately to no 
more than a vague obligation to be fair; . . .  If the law does this, 
it abandons all effective control over the decision-maker. 
By helping to assure greater accountability of directors, the suggested approach will likely 
assist to improve the efficiency of companies.  This will benefit not only shareholders. 
Aggregate social welfare might thereby be enhanced. 
 
84 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 1.5 para 1.9.  See also Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 
1 All E R 568 at 579 (per Lord Bridge). 
85 Ford et al, above n 38, para 8.095 at 319.  See also I A Renard, `Commentary’ in P D Finn (ed), Equity 
and Commercial Relationships, 1987, The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney at 140. 
86 See H Hansmann & R Kraakman, `The End of History for Corporate Law’ Harvard Law School, John 
M Olin Center for Law, economics and Business, Discussion Paper No 280, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ (accessed 11 February 2002) at 2-3. 
87 Id. 
88 Sealy, above n 83, at 175. 
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A further advantage of adopting shareholder welfare enhancement as the guiding criterion for 
testing the validity of an exclusivity or break-up fee agreement is that it promotes `a more 
precise, concrete, material inquiry.’89  This is likely to promote certainty and predictability.  
With the object of the law clearly enunciated, all parties concerned – directors, shareholders, 
prospective acquirers and judges - know the parameters of permitted conduct.  This enables 
all participants in merger / takeover transactions to organise their affairs on reasonable 
expectations.  The resulting certainty and predictability may encourage interested parties to 
more readily challenge welfare diminishing lock-ups.  The role of the law in promoting 
shareholder and social welfare might thereby be enhanced. 
Therefore, the law should be amended to provide that directors may agree to a no-shop / no-
talk clause or break-up fee only if it is for the benefit of shareholders.  As the benefit of 
shareholders is usually equated with shareholder wealth maximisation,90 it should ordinarily 
be permissible for directors to enter into such an agreement only if it is calculated to secure 
the best reasonably obtainable offer for shareholders.  An example of this is an agreement 
that is likely to induce an initial bid, where none has been forthcoming, or one that is likely to 
`entice other bidders to enter a contest for control of the corporation, creating an auction for 
the company and maximizing shareholder profit.’91  Measures (usually taken in response to 
an acquisition bid not favoured by incumbent directors or in anticipation of such a bid92) 
which end an active auction, foreclose further bidding or make it more difficult for a potential 
competing bid to succeed should not be permitted.  They operate to the detriment of 
shareholders.93  By discouraging competing bids, they not only deny shareholders a higher 
 
89 Heydon, above n 50, at 123 
90 See discussion accompanying notes 56-57 above. 
91 Revlon Inc v Macandrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2D 173 (1986) at 182.  See also Hanson Trust 
plc v ML SCM Acquisitions Inc 781 F 2d 264 at 274 (1986). 
92 These are popularly referred to as ‘second bidder’ and ‘anticipatory’ lock-ups respectively.  See 
generally Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1563. 
93 See further Revlon Inc v Macandrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2D 173 (1986) at 183. 
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premium for their shares.  They also potentially whittle down the allocative role of transfer of 
corporate control transactions, which might adversely affect the efficient functioning of the 
economy generally.94  Indeed, in recognition of their deleterious effects, the Takeovers Panel, 
the agency vested with primary responsibility for the resolution of takeover disputes in 
Australia95 has signaled its opposition to the use of these measures in takeover transactions.96
For the avoidance of doubt, the governing rule should expressly state that the acceptance of a 
no-shop / no-talk provision, whether it contains a fiduciary-out clause or not, does not in any 
way affect the directors’ obligation to continue to act in the best interest of shareholders.  
Under the proposed rule, the directors would be free to agree not to shop for competing bids 
if they have seriously shopped around, have bargained as hard as they can and are satisfied, 
on available credible information, that the no-shop bidder is offering the best price at the time 
of the agreement.  This is beneficial to all parties.  It protects the bidder’s investment in 
researching and negotiating the merger.  At the same time, it assures the target shareholders 
of a committed and seriously negotiated agreement.97  However, directors would still have a 
duty to receive and consider information from rival bidders, if any should be forthcoming.  
Directors are under a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the company and to exercise 
due care in managing the affairs of their company.98  To discharge these obligations 
effectively, it is imperative that they take into account all information reasonably available.  
Information from potential rival bidders could provide new insights regarding the value of the 
company.  Disregarding that information `could prevent the board from learning about a 
potentially superior proposal.’99  This could hurt the interests of shareholders. 
 
94 See further Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1563-64. 
95 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 6.10, Division 2. 
96 See Takeovers Panel, above n 15, paras 18-20 and 28-30. 
97 See further Burgess, above n 12, at 469-70. 
98 See discussion in Part 3.1 above. 
99 Burgess, above n 12, at 470;  Lebovitch & Morrison,  above n 28 at 19-20. 
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In addition, directors would also be required to consider an unsolicited rival bid that tops the 
no-shop bid if one is subsequently made.  In that eventuality, the directors would be required 
to negotiate with the rival bidder for the best value reasonably available to the shareholders, 
provide relevant information to the rival bidder, if necessary, and accept the rival bid if it is 
superior to the no-shop bid.100
This proposal, which significantly enjoys the support of the Takeovers Panel,101 serves some 
important functions.  First and foremost, it sets a realistic check on the ability of directors to 
implement measures which may have the effect of nullifying the shareholders’ statutory 
power to approve or reject merger transactions.  Secondly, it preserves the auction process. 
This is likely to enhance both shareholder and social welfare.  An auction can assist 
shareholders to receive an alternative and possibly better offer for their shares.102  Further, as 
the success of a competing offer does not depend on the target directors’ co-operation,103 the 
potential problem of management self-interest discussed before104 is overcome.  And, to the 
extent it facilitates the re-allocation of corporate resources to their highest valued uses,105 the 
auction process is likely to benefit society generally. 
These proposals are susceptible to attack on the ground that they focus primarily on the 
interests of existing shareholders.  There is a view in some quarters that directors ought not to 
 
100 This approach is, indeed, consistent with that taken by the courts in some overseas jurisdictions.  See 
for example Dawson International plc v Coats Paton plc [1989] BCLC 233; John Crowther Group Ltd 
v Carpets International plc [1990] BCLC 460.  Significantly, the Delaware Supreme Courts, one of the 
most influential courts on matters of corporate law in the United States has expressed its disapproval of 
provisions in merger agreements which have the effect of preventing directors from considering all 
reasonably available information.  See for example Paramount Communications v QVC Network 637 A 
2d 34 at 49 (1993);  Ace Ltd v Capital Re Corp 747 A 2d at 106 (1999);  Phelps Dodge Corp v Cyprus 
Amax Minerals Co 1999 WL 1054255. 
101 See Takeovers Panel, above n 15, paras 31-2. 
102 Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1563-64. 
103 Ibid, at 1564;  Bainbridge, above n 15, at 273-75 and 318. 
104 See discussion accompanying note 27 above. 
105 Kahan & Klausner, above n 13, at 1563-64. 
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be guided solely by the interests of current members, but should also relevantly endeavour to 
promote the long-term interests of the company, including its future shareholders.106
While this course may be justified in some circumstances, it is, with respect, not altogether 
appropriate in merger and corporate control transactions.  Where control of a company is 
bound to change, there is no reason for the directors to concern themselves with the future of 
the company.  As the full English Court of Appeal rightly observed in Heron International 
Ltd v Lord Grade, Associated Communications Corp PLC,107 after a change in control, the 
future of the company lies with the new controller.  The directors owe no duty to the new 
controller or the company after it has passed to the new controller.  The new controller can 
look after himself.108  So, where a change of corporate control is involved, the proper concern 
of the directors should be to maximise the welfare of existing shareholders.  This means 
obtaining the best available price for these shareholders.  As, in substance, the economic 
consequences of a merger are the same as those of a transaction involving a transfer of 
corporate control,109 this same rule should also apply in merger transactions not involving a 
change of control. 
It is worth noting here that the Delaware Supreme Court, a court whose decisions on matters 
of corporate law are very much respected in the United States of America, has also taken a 
similar approach on this matter.  In Revlon Inc v Macandrews & Forbes Holdings Inc,110 that 
court ruled that `where a change of corporate control is involved, the duty of the board 
changes from the preservation of the company to the maximization of the company’s value at 
 
106 See for example Counsel’s opinion cited in Davies, above n 25, at 606 (fn 38). 
107 [1983] BCLC 244. 
108 Ibid at 265.  On this see further Lebovitch & Morrison,  above n 28, at 36-9. 
109 As Vice Chancellor Leo Strine Jr has reminded us each of these transactions represents the final 
opportunity for the target shareholders to be afforded payment for their now exclusive ownership of the 
target company.  See Strine Jr above n 14, at 928-930. 
110 506 A 2D 173 (1986). 
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a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.’111  It restated the same principle in Paramount 
Communications v QVC Network.112  There it held that in circumstances involving a transfer 
of corporate control,113
the directors must focus on one primary objective – to secure 
the transaction offering the best value reasonably available for 
the stockholders. The board must act in a neutral manner to 
encourage the highest possible price for shareholders. 
This point was re-emphasised later on in the same judgment, with the court declaring that 
`when a corporation undertakes a transaction which will cause . . . a change in corporate 
control or . . . a break-up of the corporate entity, the directors’ obligation is to seek the best 
value reasonably available for the stockholders.’114
Structural changes in the world economy and developments in technology are fast rendering 
national markets irrelevant.  Capital and securities markets are now becoming increasingly 
international.  In these circumstances, Australian policy makers would be well advised to 
reform its law to accord investors in local companies the same protection as their counterparts 
overseas.  If Australian law does not guarantee shareholders adequate protection, Australian 
companies might find it difficult to raise capital in the world's financial markets.115
 
111 Ibid, at 182 
112 637 A 2d 34 at 49 (1993). 
113 Ibid, at 44. 
114 Ibid, at 48. 
115 See further J Mayanja, `Reforming Australia's Takeover Defence Laws: What Role for Target 
Directors? - A Reply And Extension (1999) 10 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 162 at 191;  M Kirby, ‘Corporate 
Governance, Corporate Law and Global Forces’ in I Ramsay (ed), Corporate Governance and the 
Duties of Company Directors, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, The University of 
Melbourne, Melbourne, 1997 at 51-52.  An interesting discussion of some of the challenges and 
problems posed to Australia by the internationalisation of securities markets can be found in L Masel, 
`The Growing Internationalisation of Securities Markets - Implications For Australia' in Countertrade, 
Protectionism, Deregulation And Arbitration in Australia-Asia-The Pacific, Asian Law Centre, 
Melbourne, July 1985 at 101 et seq;  S Sporkin, `Securities and Financial Market Regulation in the 
1990s' (1991) 18 Securities Regulation Law Journal 414. 
Lock-ups and the duties of directors         
 
31
 
                                                
4.2 Calibration of break-up fees 
To minimise the potential for abuse, it is prudent to regulate the size of break-up fees.  
Because these arrangements can serve some beneficial functions,116 the relevant rules should 
permit their use, in accordance with the principles discussed above, but ensure that the agreed 
fee is within the range of reasonableness, and is fully disclosed to the shareholders. 
The principal aim of break-up fees is to entice a potential merger partner or acquirer either to 
make an initial bid, or to enter a bidding contest, for the target.  The need for such an 
incentive is particularly evident in those circumstances where a prospective bidder is 
reluctant to expend considerable sums to attempt an acquisition if it is not confident of 
recovering those costs if the company is, ultimately, acquired by another party.  In light of 
this, the rules adopted should explicitly make clear that the object of a break-up fee 
agreement is to induce a bid and to compensate the grantee for out-of-pocket expenses.117  As 
such, any amount in excess of bid costs should be disallowed.  Such costs are not necessary 
to induce bids.  The agreement should not be used to confer a gratuitous benefit upon the 
grantee should the anticipated merger fail.  This would amount to a waste of corporate 
resources.118  Nor should it be entered into simply to make it more difficult for potential 
competing bids to succeed or to penalize shareholders for not approving a merger. 
As a break up fee is, in effect, an advance estimate by the parties of the loss likely to be 
suffered by the grantee if the merger is not approved by the shareholders,119 it should be 
 
116 As to these see discussion in Part 2 above especially text accompanying notes 21-26. 
117 This view is shared by the Takeovers Panel.  See Takeovers Panel, above n 15, paras 8, 17.  See further 
Annexure to Guidance Note, paras 1-3. 
118 In this connection, see Plaut v Steiner (1989) 5 BCC 352 at 364 and Barclays Bank v British and 
Commonwealth Holdings plc (1996) 1 BCLC 1 at 41 for dicta suggesting that in cases involving break 
fees, any amount which exceeds the bidder’s wasted expenditure may well amount to a gift, and 
possibly unlawful.  See also Takeovers Panel, above n 15, Annexure to Guidance Note, para 7. 
119 See Bainbridge, above n 15, at 245. 
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treated as a liquidated damages clause.  Ordinarily, therefore, it should be upheld if it is 
reasonable in light of the bidder’s costs and the magnitude of the transaction.120  Conversely, 
the clause should be treated as a penalty, and disallowed, if the amount involved appears to 
be unconscionable or is not rationally related to the damage likely to be sustained by the 
bidder as a result of the failure by shareholders to approve the merger.121
To determine whether or not the agreed fee is reasonable, guidance should be sought from the 
principles accepted by the courts for analysing the award of damages in the law of contract. 
Current learning teaches that `the object of an award of damages is to give the plaintiff 
compensation for the damage, loss or injury he has suffered.’122  Indeed, in Robinson v 
Harman,123 which is widely acknowledged as the leading authority on the measure of 
damages in contract,124 Parke B held that:125
where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, 
he [or she] is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the 
same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had 
been performed. 
 
120 On this see generally Block et al, above n 15, at 966 and the cases cited therein; Kahan & Klausner, 
above n 13, at 1565-66. 
121 On penalties see further N C Seddon & M P Ellinghaus, Chesire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract, Seventh 
Australian Edition 1997, Butterworths, Sydney para 23.35 (at 801-2) and the cases cited there. 
122 H McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 15th ed 1988, Sweet & Maxwell, London, para 9 (citations 
omitted).  See further S Jacobs, Damages in a Commercial Context, 2000, LBC Information Services, 
Sydney, at 51-61;  S M Waddams, `The Principles of Compensation' in P D Finn, Essays On Damages, 
The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1992 at 1;  A McInnes, Handbook On Damages, The Law Book 
Company Limited, Sydney, 1992 at 7-10. 
123 [1848] 1 Ex 850. 
124 See McGregor, above n 122, para 9 (at 8-9); Jacobs, above n 122, paras 5.17 (at 54). 
125 [1848] 1 Ex 850 at 855 (parenthesis added).  The same principle is applied in Australia.  See for 
example The Commonwealth Of Australia v Amman Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 80;  Gates v City 
Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd  (1986) 160 CLR 1 at 11-12;  McRae v Commonwealth Disposals 
Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377. 
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In attempting to achieve this, the courts may award either `expectation’ damages or `reliance’ 
damages.126  The object of awarding expectation damages is to protect a party against loss of 
profits.  As Fuller and Purdue elucidated in their seminal 1936 article, in the event of a breach 
contract:127
we may seek to give the promisee the value of the expectancy 
which the promise created.  We may in a suit for specific 
performance actually compel the defendant to render the 
promised performance to the plaintiff, or, in a suit for damages, 
we may make the defendant pay the money value of this 
performance.  Here our objective is to put the plaintiff in as 
good a position as he would have occupied had the defendant 
performed his promise.  The interest protected in this case we 
may call the expectation interest. 
On the other hand, reliance damages enable the victim to recoup wasted expenditure.  To 
return to Fuller and Purdue:128
we may award damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of 
undoing the harm which his reliance on the defendant’s promise 
has caused him [or her].  For example, the buyer under a 
contract for the sale of land has incurred expense in the 
investigation of the seller’s title or has neglected the opportunity 
to enter other contracts.  Our object is to put him [or her] in as 
good a position as he was in before the Promise was made.  The 
interest protected in this case may be called the reliance 
interest. 
For the purposes of determining whether or not a break-up fee is reasonable, it would appear 
that the `expectation damages’ analysis, which seeks to compensate for lost profits, is not 
apposite.  Ordinarily, it would be a fairly difficult task for a bidder to establish that a 
proposed merger would have resulted in a profit, let alone the level of that profit.  The 
 
126 See generally The Commonwealth of Australia v Amman Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 82; Jacobs, 
above n 122, paras 5.16-5.41. 
127 Fuller & Purdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 52 at 54. 
See further Seddon & Ellinghaus, above n 121, para 23.20 (at 788);  The Commonwealth Of Australia v 
Amman Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 82. 
128 Fuller and Purdue, above n 127 at 54 (words in parentheses not in original).  See also Regan, above n 
29, at 34-35. 
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realization of benefits from a merger is not fully within the control of a successful bidder.  
Several other variables come into play.  For example, there is the possibility that the bidder 
would not have won in the market, operating costs, levels of competition and so on.  In these 
circumstances, therefore, it is advisable that the enquiry focus, relevantly, on the expenditure 
rendered futile by non-consummation of the merger.129  So, the `reliance damages’ analysis 
should be applied.  A break-up fee clause should be upheld if it is a reasonable forecast of the 
actual expense incurred by a frustrated bidder.130
This approach is in keeping with that adopted by the High court of Australia in assessing 
damages in cases of breach of contract where damages for future loss of profit cannot be 
readily ascertained.  For example, in the leading case of The Commonwealth of Australia v 
Amman Pty Ltd,131 the respondent entered into a contract with the Commonwealth to 
undertake aerial surveillance of the northern coastline of Australia for the purposes of 
detecting unauthorized landings.  The respondent experienced delays in procuring the 
necessary number of properly fitted and equipped aircraft, as a result of which it was unable 
to perform its contract immediately.  In consequence, the Commonwealth served on the 
respondent notice of termination of the contract.  The respondent sued for damages for breach 
of contract. 
The trial judge found for the respondent but awarded damages for lost profits, which were far 
below the amount expended by the respondent in preparation for the performance of the 
contract.  On appeal, the award was augmented to take into account the respondent’s wasted 
expenditure.  The Commonwealth appealed to the High Court where it argued, inter-alia, that 
it was wrong to award damages where it could not be established that the respondent would 
 
129 See generally McGregor, above n 122, paras 49 (at 29) and 58-9 (at 35-6);  M Owen,  ‘Some Aspects 
of the Recovery of Reliance Damages’  (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies’ 393 at 395-99. 
130 See further Seddon & Ellinghaus, above n 121, para 23.35 (at 801-2). 
131 (1991) 174 CLR 64. 
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have made a profit on the contract.  This argument was comprehensively rejected by the High 
Court.  Of particular significance, Mason C J and Dawson J held, in a joint judgment, that:132
where it is not possible for a plaintiff to demonstrate whether or 
to what extent the performance of a contract would have 
resulted in a profit for the plaintiff, it will be open to a plaintiff 
to seek to recoup expenses incurred, damages in such a case 
being described as reliance damages or damages for wasted 
expenditure. 
The High court also took a similar approach in the earlier case of McRae v Commonwealth 
Disposal Commission.133
It is worthy of note at this stage that the need to regulate break-up fee agreements has been 
recognised by the Takeovers Panel, a key business regulatory agency in Australia.  In 
response to the increasing popularity of lock-up devices in Australia, the Panel has issued a 
Guidance Note setting out its view as to the circumstances in which it considers the use of 
these arrangements acceptable.  Quite significantly, the Panel makes clear in that guidance 
note that it frowns upon the use of break-up fees simply to confer a windfall gain on the 
counter-party,134 to stifle competing bids135 or coerce shareholders to accept a particular 
offer.136  The Panel sees the role of break-up fees as being to enable the bidder to recoup its 
wasted expenditure and reasonable opportunity costs.137
 
132 Ibid, at 81.  See also the separate judgments of Deane J (at 127-8) and Toohey J (at 135). 
133 (1951) 84 CLR 377.  For an insightful commentary on reliance damages in Australia see Jacobs, above 
n 122, para 5.33. 
134 See Takeovers Panel, above n 15, Annexure, para 7. 
135 Takeovers Panel, above n 15, paras 8 and 19. 
136 Ibid, para 20. 
137 Ibid, especially para 7 and  Annexure, paras 2 - 3. 
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The Panel counsels that when used, a break-up agreement should have a `clear dollar or per 
centage cap.  In this regard a cap of 1% of the value of the bid is a reasonable guide for 
bids.’138
The Panel’s guidelines mirror the rules adopted by the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 
a self-regulatory body responsible for the regulation of takeover and merger activity in the 
United Kingdom, to address concerns regarding the use of break-up fees in that jurisdiction.  
The City Panel’s rule, which seeks to provide some safeguards for shareholders whenever it 
is proposed to pay a break-up fee provides, relevantly, that:139
 the fee must be de minimis (normally no more than one per 
cent of the offer value) and the offeree company board and 
its financial adviser must confirm to the London Takeovers 
Panel in writing that, inter alia, they believe the fee to be in 
the best interest of shareholders.  Any fee arrangement must 
be fully disclosed in the announcement made under Rule 2.5 
[ie the press release announcing the offer] and in the offer 
document.  Relevant documents must be put on display . . .; 
and 
 the Panel must be consulted at the earliest opportunity. 
This rule was introduced out of the City Panel’s concern to ensure that:140
the interests of the offeree shareholders are not adversely 
affected by inducement fee arrangements.  The payment of such 
fees will necessarily reduce offeree shareholders’ funds, and in 
cases where the offeree board has received an approach from 
another party, there are concerns that a bona fide offer may be 
frustrated by reason of these arrangements. 
 
138 Ibid, para 14. 
139 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule 21(2), introduced July 2000.  Reproduced in CCH, British 
Company Law and Practice, para 65-800. 
140 City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Inducement Fees, Statement 1999/10, 16 July 1999. 
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There is no doubt that objective of these initiatives is to ensure that break-up fees are kept 
within the bounds of reasonableness.  This is a positive step in the protection of shareholders 
for which these regulators should be congratulated. 
However, in its Guidance Note, the Takeovers Panel, while recognising that `reimbursement 
of opportunity costs is a difficult area,’141 has left the door open to such claims.142  According 
to the Panel, such fees `will only be acceptable in relation to the reasonable opportunity costs 
to the bidder in making its bid, and will not be acceptable where they are to reimburse profit 
expected on the success of the proposed bid.’143  So, it appears that while disallowing claims 
for lost profits, the Panel will be prepared to entertain claims for losses incurred in not 
pursuing alternative merger/acquisition opportunities.  This is problematic.  Because of the 
difficulty of ascertaining the value of foregone opportunities, a difficulty which the Panel 
itself has recognised,144 the allowance of this head of claim is likely to introduce much 
uncertainty in determining whether a particular break-up fee is reasonable. This is 
undesirable.  To remove this uncertainty, it is advisable to restrict recoverable costs to the 
bidder’s actual total pre-and post-bid costs - its reliance damages in contract terms, in 
accordance with the principles discussed above.145
5 CONCLUSION 
The current legal scheme for regulating the use of no-shop / no-talk and break-up fee 
agreements is not satisfactory.  Under the present regime, interested parties cannot safely 
predict whether or not a decision by the directors to enter into any of these arrangements will 
 
141 Takeovers Panel, above n 15,  Annexure, para 4. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See text accompanying notes 128-133 above. 
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be upheld by the court, if challenged.  This resultant uncertainty has the potential to diminish 
the protection of the interests of shareholders.  It can also potentially discourage some parties 
from entering into what might otherwise be value creating merger transactions. 
In order to promote shareholder and social welfare to the fullest extent possible, the law 
should be reformed to define more explicitly the obligations of directors in relation to the use 
of exclusivity provisions and break-up fee arrangements.  In undertaking this task, policy 
makers should adopt shareholder welfare enhancement as the criterion for developing the 
rules applicable in this area.  Under these rules, only no-shop agreements and break-up fee 
arrangements that entice bidders or promote an auction for the company should be permitted.  
Arrangements that unfairly favour one party, repel other potential bidders or prevent directors 
from receiving or considering alternative bids should be disallowed.  These proposals, if 
accepted, are likely to lead to a relatively clear and predictable regulatory framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXCLUSIVITY-VERSION2.DOC 
